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Introduction and summary
Last year, a Federal Reserve Study Group, in which
we participated, examined the use of subordinated
debt as a tool for disciplining bank risk taking. The
study was completed prior to the passage of the 1999
U.S. Financial Services Modernization Act and the
results are reported in Kwast et al. (1999). The report
provides a broad survey of the academic literature on
subordinated debt and of prevailing practices within
the current market for subordinated debt issued by
banking organizations. Although the report discusses
a number of the issues to be considered in developing
a policy proposal, providing an explicit proposal was
not the purpose of the report. Instead, it concludes
with a call for additional research into a number of
related topics.
In this article, we present a proposal for the use
of subordinated debt in bank capital regulation. Briefly,
our proposal would require that banks hold a minimum
level of subordinated debt and be required to approach
the marketplace on a somewhat regular basis to roll
over that debt. We believe the proposal is particularly
timely for a variety of reasons, one of which is that
Congress recently demonstrated its interest in the
topic when it passed the U.S. Financial Services
Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). The
act instructs the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve and the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct
a joint study of the potential use of subordinated debt
to bring market forces to bear on the operations of
large financial institutions and to protect the deposit
insurance funds.1 The act also requires large U.S. na-
tional banks to have outstanding (but not necessarily
subordinated) debt that is highly rated by independent
agencies in order to engage in certain types of finan-
cial activities. Another reason to consider alternatives
now is that banks in most developed countries, includ-
ing the U.S., are relatively healthy. This reduces the
Douglas D. Evanoff and Larry D. Wall
probability that a greater reliance on market discipline
will cause a temporary market disruption. Addition-
ally, history shows that introducing reforms during
relatively tranquil times is preferable to being forced
to act during a crisis.2
Perhaps the most important reason that now may
be a good time to consider greater reliance on subor-
dinated debt is that international efforts to reform
existing capital standards are highlighting the weak-
nesses of the alternatives. In 1988, the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision published the International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards, which established international agreement
on minimum risk-based capital adequacy ratios.3 The
paper, often referred to as the Basel Capital Accord,
relied on very rough measures of a banks credit risk
exposure, however, and banks have increasingly en-
gaged in regulatory arbitrage to reduce the cost of
complying with the requirements (Jones, 2000). The
result is that by the end of the 1990s, the risk-based
capital requirements had become more of a compli-
ance issue than a safety and soundness issue for the
largest and most sophisticated banks.
Bank supervisors have recognized the problems
associated with the 1988 accord, and the Basel
Committee recently proposed two possible alternatives:
a standardized approach that uses credit rating agen-
cies to evaluate individual loans in banks portfolios
and an internal ratings approach that uses the ratings
of individual loans that are assigned by banks inter-
nal ratings procedures. An important element of both41 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
of these proposals is that they rely on risk measures
obtained from private sector participants rather than
formulas devised by supervisors.4 The use of market
risk measures has the potential to provide substan-
tially more accurate risk measurement than would
any supervisory formula. Market participants have
the flexibility to evaluate all aspects of a position and
assign higher risk weights where appropriate.
Whether either of these approaches would result
in a significant improvement, however, is question-
able. The approaches share two significant weakness-
es. First, both ask for opinions rather than relying on
private agents behavior. Economists have long been
trained to focus on prices and quantities established
in arms-length transactions rather than on surveys of
individual opinions. The problem with opinions is
that individuals responses may depend not only on
their beliefs but also on what they want the question-
er to think. Second, the reliance in this case on opin-
ions is especially problematic because the two parties
being asked about a banks risk exposure both have
an incentive to underestimate that exposure. The firm
seeking a rating compensates the ratings agencies. If
the primary purpose of the rating is to satisfy bank
supervisors, then firms will have a strong incentive
to pressure the agencies to supply higher ratings.5
The incentive conflict for banks is even more direct.
The intent of Basels capital proposal appears to be
to require banks to hold more capital than they other-
wise would. If this is true, banks will have incentives
to systematically underestimate their risk exposure.
The use of a risk measure obtained from the sub-
ordinated debt market has the potential to avoid both
of these problems. The measure could use actual prices
rather than some individuals opinion. Further, the inter-
ests of subordinated debt creditors are closely aligned
with those of bank supervisors, in that subordinated
creditors are at risk of loss whenever a bank fails.
Below, we summarize some of the existing sub-
ordinated debt proposals. Then, we introduce our new
proposal, address some of the common concerns raised
about the viability of subordinated debt proposals, and
explain how our proposal addresses these concerns.
Brief summary of past proposals
Since the mid-1980s there have been a number
of regulatory reform proposals aimed at capturing the
benefits of subordinated debt (sub-debt).6 Below, we
provide a partial review of previous proposals that
emphasizes the characteristics on which our proposal
rests. (These are surveyed in greater detail in Kwast
et al., 1999). It was common in the earlier proposals
for the authors not to provide a comprehensive plan,
but instead to stress the expected benefits and describe
how these could be realized. Specific characteristics
were typically excluded to avoid having the viability
of the proposals determined by the acceptance of the
details. The typical benefits of the proposals relate to
the ability of sub-debt to provide a capital cushion
and to impose both direct and derived discipline to
banks and from the tax benefits of debt.7 These bene-
fits include the following:
n a bank riskiness or asset quality signal for regula-
tors and market participants,
n a more prompt failure resolution process, resulting
in fewer losses to the insurance fund,
n a more methodical failure resolution process because
debtholders unlike demand depositors must wait
until the debt matures to walk away from the
bank rather than run, and
n a lower cost of capital because of the tax advan-
tages of deducting interest payments on debt as
an expense, enabling banks to reduce their cost
of capital and/or supervisors to increase capital
requirements.
Horvitz (1983, 1984) discusses each of these
advantages in his initial sub-debt proposal and extends
that discussion in Benston et al. (1986). He challenges
the view that equity capital is necessarily preferable
to debt. While equity is permanent and losses can
indeed be charged against it, he questions why one
would want to keep a troubled bank in operation
long enough to make this feature relevant. Similarly,
while interest on debt does represent a fixed charge
against bank earnings, whereas dividends on equity
do not, a bank with problems significant enough to
prevent these interest payments has most likely already
incurred deposit withdrawals and has reached, or is
approaching, insolvency. Arguing that higher capital
levels are needed at the bank level and are simply not
feasible through equity alone, Horvitz states that sub-
debt requirements of say, 4 percent of assets are a
means to increase total capital requirements to 9 per-
cent to 10 percent. Without providing specifics, he
argues that debtholders would logically require debt
covenants that would give them the right to close or
take over the bank once net worth was exhausted. Thus,
sub-debt is seen as an ideal cushion for the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
Keehn (1988) incorporates sub-debt as a center-
piece of the comprehensive FRB-Chicago Proposal
for deregulation.8 The plan calls for a modification
of the 8 percent capital requirement to require that
a minimum of 4 percent of risk-weighted assets be
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of no less than five years, with the issues being stag-
gered to ensure that between 10 percent and 20 per-
cent of the debt would mature and be rolled over each
year. A banks inability to do so would serve as a
clear signal that it was in financial trouble, triggering
regulatory restrictions and debt covenants.9 Debt
covenants would enable the debtholders to initiate
closure procedures and would convert debtholders to
an equity position once equity was exhausted. They
would have a limited time to recapitalize the bank,
find a suitable acquirer, or liquidate the bank. Keehn
argues that debtholders could be expected to effectively
discipline bank behavior and provide for an orderly
resolution process when failure did occur. The disci-
pline imposed by sub-debt holders could differ signifi-
cantly from that imposed by depositors as holders of
outstanding sub-debt could not run from the bank,
but could only walk as issues matured. The potential
for regulatory forbearance is also thought to be less
as holders of sub-debt would be less concerned with
giving the troubled bank additional time to correct
its problems and would pressure regulators to act
promptly when banks in which they had invested
encountered difficulties.
To address concerns about the mispriced bank
safety net and potential losses to the insurance fund,
Wall (1989) introduces a sub-debt plan aimed at cre-
ating a banking environment that, while maintaining
deposit insurance, would function like an environment
that did not have deposit insurance. Walls plan is to
have banks issue and maintain puttable sub-debt
equal to 4 percent to 5 percent of risk-weighted assets.
If debtholders exercised the put option, that is, if they
required the bank to redeem its debt, the bank would
have 90 days to make the necessary adjustments to
ensure the minimum regulatory requirements were
still satisfied. That is, either retire the debt and con-
tinue to meet the regulatory requirement because of
excess debt holdings, issue new puttable debt, or shrink
assets to satisfy the requirement. If the bank could
not satisfy the requirement after 90 days, it would be
resolved. The put characteristic has advantages in
that it would force the bank to continually satisfy the
market of its soundness. Additionally, while earlier
plans discussed the need for bond covenants to protect
debtholders, all contingencies would be covered under
this plan as the market could demand redemption of
the bonds without cause. This would essentially elimi-
nate the practice of regulatory forbearance, which was
a significant concern at the time, and would subject
the bank to increased market discipline. Wall also
stresses the need for restrictions on debtholders to
limit insider holdings.
Calomiris (1997, 1998, 1999) augments previous
sub-debt proposals by requiring a minimal requirement
(say 2 percent of total assets) and imposing a yield
ceiling (say 50 basis points above the riskless rate).
The spread ceiling is seen as a simple means of imple-
menting regulatory discipline for banks. If banks
cannot roll over the debt at the mandated spread,
they would be required to shrink their risk-weighted
assets to stay compliant. Debt would have a two-year
maturity with issues being staggered to have equal
portions come due each month. This would limit the
maximum required monthly asset reduction to approx-
imately 4 percent of assets. To ensure adequate disci-
pline, Calomiris also incorporates restrictions on who
would be eligible to hold the debt.10
The effectiveness of any sub-debt requirement
depends critically on the structure and characteristics
of the program. Most importantly, the characteristics
should be consistent with the regulatory objectives,
such as increasing direct discipline to alter risk behav-
ior, increasing derived discipline, or limiting or elim-
inating regulatory forbearance. Keehn, for example,
is particularly interested in derived discipline. Walls
proposal is most effective at addressing regulatory
forbearance. Calomiriss spread ceiling most directly
uses derived discipline to force the bank into behav-
ioral changes when the spread begins to bind.
We believe that sub-debts greatest value in the
near term is as a risk signal. The earliest proposals had
limited discussion of the use of sub-debt for derived
regulatory discipline. The next round of plans, such
as those by Keehn and Wall, use derived discipline,
but the only signal they obtain from the sub-debt
market is the banks ability to issue the debt. We have
considerable sympathy for this approach. These types
of plans maximize the scope for the free market to
allocate resources by imposing minimal restrictions
while eliminating forbearance and protecting the de-
posit insurance fund. However, the cost of providing
bank managers with this much freedom is to delay
regulatory intervention until a bank is deemed by the
markets to be too risky to save. As Benston and
Kaufman (1988) argue, proposals to delay regulatory
intervention until closure may be time inconsistent
in that such abrupt action may be perceived by regu-
lators as suboptimal when the tripwire is triggered.
Moreover, market discipline will be eroded to the
extent that market participants do not believe the
plan will be enforced. Benston and Kaufman argue
that a plan of gradually stricter regulatory interven-
tion as a banks financial condition worsens may be
more credible. A version of that proposal, prompt
corrective action, was adopted as part of the FDIC
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA).43 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Using sub-debt rates, Calomiris provides a mech-
anism for this progressive discipline that in theory
could last approximately two years. In practice, how-
ever, his plan would likely provide the same sort of
abrupt discipline as the prior proposals, with the pri-
mary difference being that Calomiriss plan would
likely trigger the discipline while the bank was in a
stronger condition. His plan requires banks to shrink
if they cannot issue subordinated debt at a sufficiently
small premium. This would provide a period during
which the bank could respond by issuing new equity.
If the bank could not or did not issue equity, then it
would most likely call in maturing loans to good bor-
rowers and sell its most liquid assets to minimize its
losses. However, the most liquid assets are also like-
ly to be among the lowest risk assets, implying that
with each monthly decline in size, the bank would be
left with a less liquid and more risky portfolio. This
trend is likely to reduce most banks viability signifi-
cantly within, at most, a few months. Yet, the previous
proposals that would rely on a banks ability to issue
subordinated debt at any price also give managers
some time to issue new equity either by automatically
imposing a stay (Walls proposal) or by requiring rel-
atively infrequent rollovers (Keehns proposal). Thus,
Calomiriss proposal is subject to the same sorts of
concerns that arise with the other proposals.
Although Calomiriss proposal for relying on
progressive discipline is more abrupt than it appears
at first glance, his suggestion that regulators use the
rates on sub-debt provides a mechanism for phasing
in stricter discipline. In the next section, we describe
our proposal, which offers a combination of Calomiriss
idea of using market rates with Benston and Kaufmans
proposal for progressively increasing discipline.11
Our sub-debt proposal differs from previous ones
in that it is more comprehensive, with an implemen-
tation schedule and a discussion of the necessary
changes from current regulatory arrangements. The
timing for such reform also seems particularly good
as there is a growing consensus that a market-driven
means to augment supervisory discipline is needed.
Furthermore, banks as a group are relatively healthy,
creating an environment in which a carefully thought-
out plan can be implemented instead of the hurried-
ly imposed regulations that sometimes follow a
financial crisis.
A new comprehensive sub-debt proposal
As discussed earlier, banking organizations en-
try into new activities is raising additional questions
about how best to regulate their risk behavior. Ideally,
the new activities would avoid either greatly extending
the safety net beyond its current reach or requiring
costly additional supervision procedures. A plan in-
corporating sub-debt could help in meeting these
challenges. Markets already provide most of the dis-
cipline on nondepository financial institutions, as
well as virtually all nonfinancial firms. A carefully
crafted plan may be able to tap similar market disci-
pline for financial firms to help limit the safety net
without extending costly supervision.
Below, we describe our detailed sub-debt pro-
posal. Although our target is the U.S. banking sector,
the plan has broader implications as international
capital standards come into play.12 While others have
argued that U.S. banking agencies could go forward
without international cooperation, we think there are
benefits from working with the international banking
agencies, if possible. The explicit goals of the proposal
are to: 1) limit the safety net exposure to loss, 2) estab-
lish risk measures that accurately assess the risks
undertaken by banks, especially those that are part
of large, complex financial organizations, and 3) pro-
vide supervisors with the ability to manage (but not
prevent) the exit of failing organizations. The use of
sub-debt can help achieve these goals by imposing
some direct discipline on banks, providing more
accurate risk measures, and providing the appropriate
signals for derived discipline and, ultimately, failure
resolution.
Setting the ground rules
As a starting point, we need to consider whether
a new sub-debt program should fit within the existing
regulatory framework or require adjustments to the
framework in order to effectively fulfill its role. In
our view, the goals of the proposal cannot be effec-
tively achieved in the current regulatory environment,
which allows banks to hold sub-debt, but does not
require that they do so. As a result, banks are most
likely to opt out of rolling over maturing debt or intro-
ducing new issues precisely in those situations when
sub-debt would restrict their behavior and signal the
market and regulators that the bank is financially weak.
Only a mandatory requirement would achieve the
expected benefits. Thus, our proposal requires banks
to hold minimum levels of sub-debt.
Similarly, other restrictions in the current regula-
tory environment limit the potential effectiveness of
a sub-debt program. In the current regulatory environ-
ment, the role of sub-debt in the bank capital structure
is determined by the Basel Accord, which counts
sub-debt as an element of tier 2 capital, with the asso-
ciated restrictions, and limits the amount that may be
counted as regulatory capital.44 Economic Perspectives
Maintaining the current restrictions has two both-
ersome implications. First, it dictates almost all of the
terms of the sub-debt proposal. For example, U.S.
banks operating under current Basel constraints have
generally chosen to issue ten-year sub-debt. If there
are perceived benefits from having a homogeneous
debt instrument, in the current regulatory environment
the optimal maturity would appear to be ten years.
This is not to say that if left unconstrained financial
firms would prefer ten-year maturities. Indeed bankers
frequently criticize the restrictions imposed on sub-debt
issues that, as discussed above, make it a less attrac-
tive form of capital. Ideally, without the restrictions
imposed by Basel, the maturity would be much shorter
to allow it to better match the duration of the bank
balance sheet. However once the ten-year maturity
is decided upon as a result of the restrictions, the fre-
quency of issuance is operationally limited to avoid
chopping the debt requirement too finely. For exam-
ple, with a 2 percent sub-debt requirement, mandating
issuance twice a year would require a $50 billion
bank to regularly come to the market with $50 million
issuessignificantly smaller than standard issues in
todays markets. Thus, adhering to the current Basel
restrictions would determine one of the interdepen-
dent parameters and thus drive them all. Adjusting
the Basel restrictions frees up the parameters of any
new sub-debt proposal.
The second implication of following the current
Basel Accord is that sub-debt is not designed to en-
hance market discipline. Given that sub-debt is consid-
ered an equity substitute in the capital structure, it is
designed to function much like equity and to provide
supervisory flexibility in dealing with distressed insti-
tutions. In particular, the value of the sub-debt is
amortized over a five-year period to encourage banks
to use longer-term debt. Furthermore, the interest rate
on the debt does not float, thus it is limited in its abili-
ty to impose direct discipline when there are changes
in the banks risk exposure. Finally, because sub-debt
is regarded as an inferior form of equity, the amount
of sub-debt is limited in the accord to 50 percent of
the banks tier 1 capital.13
If indeed there are benefits to giving sub-debt a
larger role in the bank capital structure, then consid-
eration should be given to eliminating the current dis-
advantages to using this instrument as capital. That is
the approach we take in our proposal.
The proposal
Our sub-debt program would be implemented in
stages as conditions permit.
Stage 1: Surveillance stage (for immediate imple-
mentation)
n Sub-debt prices and other information would be
used in monitoring the financial condition of the
25 largest banks and bank holding companies in
the U.S.14 Procedures would be implemented for
acquiring the best possible pricing data on a frequent
basis for these institutions, with supplementary
data being collected for other issuing banks and
bank holding companies. Supervisory staff would
gain experience in evaluating how bank soundness
relates to debt prices, spreads, etc., and how chang-
es in these elements correlate with firm soundness.
n Simultaneously, in line with the mandate of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, staffs of regulatory
agencies would complete a study of the value of
information derived from debt prices and quanti-
ties in determining bank soundness and evaluate
the usefulness of sub-debt in increasing market
discipline in banking. Efforts would be made to
obtain information on the depth and liquidity of
debt issues, including the issues of smaller firms.15
n If deemed necessary, the regulatory agencies would
obtain the necessary authority (via congressional
action or regulatory mandate) to require banks and
bank holding companies to issue a minimum
amount of sub-debt with prescribed characteristics
and to use the debt levels and prices in implement-
ing prompt corrective action. The legislation would
explicitly prohibit the FDIC from absorbing losses
for sub-debt-holders, thus excluding sub-debt from
the systemic risk exception in FDICIA.
n The bank regulatory agencies would work to alter
the Basel Accord to eliminate the unfavorable
characteristics of sub-debt (the 50 percent of tier 1
limitation and the required amortization).
Stage 2: Introductory stage (to be implemented when
authority to mandate sub-debt is obtained)
n The 25 largest banks would be required to issue a
minimum of 2 percent of risk-weighted assets in
sub-debt on an annual basis with qualifying issues
at least three months apart to avoid long periods
between issues or bunching of issues during
particularly tranquil times.16
n The sub-debt would have to be issued to indepen-
dent third parties and be tradable in the secondary
market. The sub-debts lead underwriter and mar-
ket makers could not be institutions affiliated with
the issuing bank, nor could the debt be held by
affiliates. Additionally, no form of credit enhance-
ment could be used to support the debt.1745 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
n The terms of the debt would need to explicitly
state and emphasize its junior status and that the
holder would not have access to a rescue under
the too-big-to-fail systemic risk clause. It is impera-
tive that the debtholders behave as junior creditors.
n Failure to comply with the issuance requirement
would trigger a presumption that the bank is criti-
cally undercapitalized. If the banks outstanding
sub-debt trades at yields comparable to those of
firms with a below investment grade rating (Ba
or lowerthat is, junk bonds) for a period of two
weeks or longer, then the bank would be presumed
to be severely undercapitalized.18
n Regulators would investigate whether the remain-
ing capital triggers or tripwires associated with
prompt corrective action could be augmented with
sub-debt rate-based triggers. The analysis would
consider both the form of the trigger mechanism
(for example, rate spreads over risk-free bonds or
relative to certain rating classes) and the exact rates/
spreads that should serve as triggers.
n The sub-debt requirement would be phased in
over a transition period.
Stage 3: Mature stage (to be implemented when adjust-
ments to the Basel Accord allow for sufficient flexi-
bility in setting the program parameters, or at such
time as it becomes clear that adequate modifications in
the international capital agreement are not possible)
n A minimum sub-debt requirement of at least 3
percent of risk-weighted assets would apply to
the largest 25 banks, with the expressed intent to
extend the requirement to additional banks unless
the regulators analysis of sub-debt markets finds
evidence that the costs of issuance by additional
banks would be prohibitive. The purpose is to allow
for an increase in the number of banks that can
cost effectively be included in the program.
n The sub-debt must be five-year, noncallable, fixed
rate debt.
n There must be a minimum of two issues a year
and the two qualifying issues must be at least two
months apart.
Discussion of the proposal
Stage 1 is essentially a surveillance and prepara-
tory stage. It is necessary because the rest of our pro-
posal requires that regulators have the ability to
require sub-debt issuance and access to data to imple-
ment the remaining portion of the plan.
At stage 2, regulators introduce the sub-debt
program and begin using sub-debt as a supplement to
the current capital tripwires under prompt corrective
action. The ultimate goal of stage 2 is to use sub-
debt-based risk measures to augment capital-based
measures, assuming a satisfactory resolution of some
practical problems discussed below. The sub-debt
tripwires initially set out in stage 2 may reasonably
be considered loose. Banks that cannot issue sub-
debt are probably at or near the brink of insolvency,
especially given that they only need to find one issu-
ance window during the course of a year. If a banks
sub-debt is trading at yields comparable to those of
junk bonds, then it is most likely having significant
difficulties, and supervisors should be actively involved
with the bank. We would not ordinarily expect super-
visors to need assistance in identifying banks experi-
encing this degree of financial distress. However, the
presence of such tripwires would reinforce the cur-
rent mandate of prompt corrective action. Further, it
would strengthen derived discipline by other market
participants by setting lower bounds on acceptable
sub-debt rates.
The use of sub-debt yields for all of the tripwires
under prompt corrective action could offer significant
advantages. As discussed earlier, market-based trip-
wires are expected to be more closely associated with
bank risk. However, two dimensions need further
work before heavy reliance on sub-debt spreads is
possible. First, regulators need to review the history
of sub-debt rates to determine how best to use them
as risk measures and how best to deal with periods of
illiquidity in the bond market.19 Second, the linking
of sub-debt rates to prompt corrective action will im-
ply a tighter link between the prompt corrective action
categories and the risk of failure than is possible un-
der the Basel Accord risk measures. Senior policy-
makers will need to decide where to set the tripwires.
What risk of failure is acceptable for a bank to be
considered well capitalized, adequately capitalized,
or undercapitalized? Thus, at this stage we recom-
mend further study by regulators, academics, and
bankers to determine the proper course.
At stage 3, the mature stage, the increased amount
of required sub-debt and the shorter maturity should
significantly enhance the opportunity for sub-debt to
exercise direct market discipline on banks. Another
advantage of this proposal is that banks would be
somewhat compensated, via the increased attractive-
ness of sub-debt as regulatory capital, for any in-
creased regulatory burden from holding the additional
debt. The removal of the restrictions would make the
cost of holding the debt less burdensome than under
current regulatory arrangements. While it is not cer-
tain, it seems likely that the net regulatory burden
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stage allow for more frequent issuance, which should
increase direct market discipline and market informa-
tion. At the same time, we believe five years is suffi-
cient to tie the debt to the bank and avoid bank runs.
The principal difference in this stage is the recom-
mendation to shorten the maturity of the sub-debt.
Requiring a shorter maturity will allow more frequent
issuance and result in a larger fraction of the sub-debt
being repriced every year. Banks should find this ad-
vantageous, because the maturity would more closely
align with the maturities on its balance sheet. A minor
downside is that it may require regulators to recali-
brate the sub-debt yield trigger points for prompt cor-
rective action for the categories of well capitalized,
adequately capitalized, and undercapitalized. However,
as indicated above, this recalibration will most likely
be an ongoing process as regulators obtain additional
market expertise.
One aspect of our proposal that may appear to be
controversial is the movement toward eliminating the
sub-debt restrictions imposed by the Basel Accord.
However, once the decision is made to employ sub-
debt for overseeing bank activities, the restrictions
appear unnecessary and overly burdensome. They only
serve to increase the cost to participating banks and
to limit the flexibility of the program. Without the
current restrictions, banks would prefer to issue
shorter-term debt and, in some situations, would be
able to count more sub-debt as regulatory capital.
Similarly, as discussed above, the parameters of any
sub-debt policy will be driven in great part by current
regulatory restrictions. Keeping those restrictions in
place would therefore place an unnecessary burden
on participating banks, and would limit regulators,
without any obvious positive payoff.20 The effort to
adjust Basel also does not slow the movement toward
implementation of a sub-debt program since it would
be phased in through the three-stage process. However,
laying out the broad parameters of the complete plan
in advance would indicate a commitment by regula-
tors and could increase the credibility of the program.21
Once fully implemented, sub-debt would become an
integral part of the regulatory structure.
Concerns and frequently asked questions
about sub-debt
There are a number of issues raised about the
viability of sub-debt proposals. Below, we address
some of these issues and clarify exactly what we
expect sub-debt programs to accomplish.22 We also
highlight where our proposed sub-debt program spe-
cifically addresses these issues.
Wont the regulatory agencies bail out troubled
institutions by making sub-debt holders at failed in-
stitutions whole if they would have suffered losses
otherwise, thus eliminating the purported benefits of
a sub-debt program? This is probably the most fun-
damental concern raised about the viability of sub-debt
proposals. An implicit guarantee may at times be
more distorting to market behavior than an explicit
guarantee. If debtholders believe that regulators will
make them whole if the issuing bank encounters dif-
ficulties and cannot make payment on their debt, then
they will behave accordingly. Acting as if they are
not subject to losses, they will fail to impose the nec-
essary discipline on which the benefits of sub-debt
proposals rely. There was evidence of such indiffer-
ence to bank risk levels in the 1980s when the bailout
of the Continental Illinois National Bank ingrained the
too-big-to-fail doctrine into bank investors decision-
making. In essence, if the market discipline is not
allowed to work, it will not. This applies to sub-debt.
However, a sub-debt bailout is unlikely under
current arrangements and our proposal makes it even
less likely. Holders of sub-debt are sophisticated inves-
tors, who understand their position of junior priority
and the resulting potential losses should the issuing
firm encounter difficulties. Additionally, since banks
are not subject to bankruptcy laws, debtholders can-
not argue for a preferred position by refusing to accept
the bankruptcy reorganization plan. Thus, they are
unable to block the resolution. So pressures to rescue
debtholders should not arise either from a perceived
status as unsophisticated investors or from their bar-
gaining power in the failure resolution process.
The FDIC guaranteed the sub-debt of Continental
of Illinois in 1984, but it did so to avoid having to
close the bank and not to protect the sub-debt investors
per se. The effect of FDICIA and its prompt correc-
tive action, least cost resolution requirements, and
too-big-to-fail policies was to significantly curtail
and limit the instances when uninsured liability holders
would be protected from losses. Benston and Kaufman
(1998) find that policy did change as a result of
FDICIA, as significantly fewer uninsured depositors
were protected from losses at both large and small
banks after passage of the legislation. Similarly,
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) find evidence that the
markets viewed FDICIA as a credible change in policy
and, as a result, sub-debt prices began reflecting dif-
ferences in bank risk exposures. Thus, the market
apparently already believes that sub-debt-holders
will not be bailed out in the future.
Under our sub-debt proposal, there would be
still lower potential for debtholder rescue. Unlike47 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
depositors, who can claim their assets on demand,
holders of the intermediate-term debt could only claim
their assets as the debt matured instead of initiating a
bank run, the kind of event that has typically
prompted the rescues we have seen in the past. Addi-
tionally, there is much less subjectivity if the sub-debt
price spreads are used for prompt corrective action
rather than book value capital ratios. Finally, under
our proposal, the sub-debt holder would be explicitly
excluded from the class of liabilities that could be
covered under the systemic risk exception. This ex-
clusion should be viewed favorably by banks. Under
the terms of the too-big-to-fail exception in FDICIA,
losses from the rescue would have to be funded via a
special assessment of banks. Therefore, banks should
encourage the FDIC to strictly limit the extent of the
liabilities rescued.
Are there cost implications for banks? Interest-
ingly, the costs associated with issuing sub-debt have
been used as an argument both for and against sub-debt
proposals. The standard argument is that there are
relative cost advantages from issuing debt resulting
from the favorable tax treatment.23 It is also argued
that closely held banks may find debt to be a less
expensive capital source as new equity injections
would come from investors who realize they will
have a minor ownership role.24 Both arguments sug-
gest that an increased reliance on sub-debt would
result in cost savings.
There are, however, some additional actual or
potential costs associated with increased sub-debt is-
sues. First, increased reliance on relatively frequent
debt rollovers would generate transaction costs or
issuance costs. There is disagreement as to just how
expensive these costs would be. Some argue that the
cost would be similar to that required for issuing
bank certificates of deposit, while others argue that
the cost could be quite substantial. The issuance fre-
quency discussed in most sub-debt proposals, howev-
er, is not very different from the current frequency at
large banking organizations. Two issues per year,
which is well within the recommendations in most
sub-debt proposals, is relatively common in todays
banking markets.25
A more significant concern seems to be where,
within the overall banking organization, the debt
would be issued. Most sub-debt proposals require the
debt to be issued at the bank level whereas, until re-
cently, most sub-debt was issued at the bank holding
company level. This allowed the holding company
the flexibility to distribute the proceeds throughout
the affiliated firms in the organization. This occurred
in spite of the fact that the rating agencies typically
rated bank debt higher than the debt of the holding
company, and, similarly, holding company debt typi-
cally traded at a premium to comparable bank debt.26
This would suggest that the additional flexibility from
issuing debt at the holding company level is of value
to the banking organization. Removal of this flexibil-
ity would impose costs. The recent trend toward issu-
ing more debt at the bank level, however, would
suggest the value of this flexibility is becoming less
important.
A more important cost implication is imbedded
in our sub-debt proposal. In the past, regulators have
restricted the use of sub-debt by limiting the amount
that could count as capital and by requiring that the
value of the sub-debt be amortized over the last five
years before maturity. These restrictions are imposed
because the firm needs to make periodic payments on
the debt, regardless of its financial condition. However,
this does not decrease the effectiveness of sub-debt
in serving the capital role as a cushion against losses.
It still buffers the insurance fund. By eliminating these
restrictions in our sub-debt proposal, we enhance the
value of the debt as capital and decrease the net cost
of introducing the proposal.
Isnt there a problem in that sub-debt proposals
are procyclical? A possible concern with sub-debt
requirements is that they may exacerbate procyclical
behavior by banksincreased lending during economic
expansions and reduced lending during recessions.
However, this is not unique to sub-debt programs;
any regulatory requirement that does not adjust over
the course of a business cycle has the potential to be
procyclical if banks seek to only satisfy the minimum
requirements. For example, appendix D of Kwast et
al. (1999) points out that bank capital adequacy ratios
are likely to decline during recessions as banks experi-
ence higher loan losses, implying that regulation
based on capital adequacy ratios has the potential to
be procyclical.27
The procyclicality of a regulatory requirement
may be at least partially offset if banks seek to
maintain some cushion above minimum regulatory
requirements that they may draw on during econom-
ic downturns. In the case of the regulatory capital
adequacy requirements, both casual observation of
recent bank behavior and formal empirical analysis
from the 1980s and early 1990s suggest that banks
do indeed seek to maintain such a cushion for con-
tingencies.28
Moreover, a regulatory program that uses sub-debt
yields as triggers for regulatory action may be designed
to induce less procyclical behavior than would other
types of regulatory requirements. Consider two ways
to design the sub-debt triggers as discussed in Kwast48 Economic Perspectives
et al. (1999). One design is to base regulatory action
on a constant basis point spread over bonds with lit-
tle or no credit risk, such as Treasury securities. Such
a standard is more likely to become binding during
recessions when banks are experiencing loan losses
and investors demand higher risk premiums to con-
tinue holding bank bonds. Thus, a policy that sets
triggers at a constant premium over Treasuries may
result in procyclical regulation in a manner similar
to that of standard capital requirements.
Another way of designing the triggers, however,
is to base them on a measure that offers countercycli-
cal yields over the business cycle, for example, the
yields on corporate bonds of a given rating. There
is evidence that bond-rating agencies seek to smooth
ratings through business cycles. For example, Theodore
(1999, p. 10) states Moodys policies:
Moodys bank ratings  aim at looking to the
medium- to long-term, through cyclical trends.
For example, a drop in quarterly, semi-annual
or even annual earnings is not necessarily a
reason to downgrade a banks ratings. However,
if the earnings drop is the result of a structural
degradation of a banks fundamentals, credit
ratings need to reflect the new developing
condition of the bank.
If the rating agencies are trying to look through
the business cycle, then the spreads on corporate
bonds over default-free securities should be small
during expansions because investors, but not the rat-
ing agencies, recognize a lower probability of default
during expansions. Similarly, the spreads on corpo-
rate bonds over default-free bonds should rise during
recessions as the markets, but not the rating agencies,
recognize the increased probability of default. Thus,
prompt corrective action triggers based on sub-debt
yields relative to corporate yields introduce an
element of smoothing. The triggers may be relatively
tight during expansions when banks should be build-
ing financial strength and relatively loose during
downturns as they draw down part of their reserves.
One case where the use of sub-debt yields may
tend to reinforce the business cycle is when liquidity
drops in all corporate bond markets and risk premi-
ums (including liquidity risk premiums) temporarily
soar.29 However, our proposal recognizes this poten-
tial problem and provides for temporary relief until
liquidity improves.
Arent supervisors better gauges of the riskiness
of a bank because they know more about each banks
exposure than the market does? If so, then why not
rely exclusively on the supervisors instead of holders
of sub-debt? In some cases the markets knowledge
of a banks exposure may indeed be a subset of the
examiners knowledge. However, we rely on markets
to discipline firm risk taking in virtually every other
sector of our economy, so markets must have some
offsetting advantages. One such advantage is that the
financial markets are likely to be better able to price
the risks they observe because market prices reflect
the consensus of many observers investing their own
funds. Another advantage of markets is that they can
avoid limitations inherent in any type of government
supervision. Supervisors are rightfully reluctant to be
making fundamental business decisions for banks
unless or until results confirm the bank is becoming
unsafe or unsound. Further, even when supervisors
recognize a serious potential problem, they have the
burden of being able to prove to a court that a bank is
engaged in unsafe activities. In contrast, in financial
markets the burden of proof is on the bank to show it
is being safely managed. A further weakness of rely-
ing solely on bank supervisors is that they are ulti-
mately accountable to the political system, which
suggests that noneconomic factors may enter into
major decisions no matter how hard supervisors try
to focus solely on the economics of a banks position.30
Sub-debt investors have no such accountability; they
may be expected to focus solely on the economic
condition of individual banks.
A typical concern surrounding sub-debt propos-
als is that the perceived intent is to supplant supervi-
sors and rely solely on the forces of the marketplace
to oversee bank behavior. In our proposal, the intent
is to augment, not reduce supervisory oversight. If
supervisors have additional information about the
condition of a bank, there is nothing in the sub-debt
proposals limiting their ability to impose sanctions
on the activities of the bank. In addition to sub-debt
serving the standard role as a loss-absorbing capital
cushion, it serves as an additional tool for use by
both the private markets and the regulators to discipline
banks objectively. In fact, one of the major components
of our proposal is to have the supervisors incorporate
the yield spreads for use in prompt corrective action.
With private markets providing information, supervi-
sors can focus their efforts on exceptional circumstanc-
es, leaving the well-understood risks for assessment by
the marketplace.
Do we currently know enough about the sub-debt
market to proceed? Although we would like to know
more about the sub-debt market, we think considerable
information is already available. The studies surveyed
and the new evidence presented in Kwast et al. (1999)
provide considerable insight into the subordinated
debt market. These studies suggest that investors in
sub-debt do discriminate on the basis of the riskiness
of their portfolios.49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Moreover, a review of the regulatory alternatives
suggests that any durable solution to achieving an
objective measure of banks risk exposure will look
something like our proposal. The problems that
plague the existing risk-based capital guidelines are
inherent in any attempt by the supervisors to measure
the riskiness of a banks portfolio based on a pre-
specified set of criteria. Over time, banks will find or
will manufacture claims whose intrinsic contribution
to the riskiness of the banks portfolio is underesti-
mated by the supervisory criteria.31 That is, banks
will attempt to arbitrage the capital requirements.
An alternative to supervisory determined criteria
is to use market evaluations. The Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision correctly moved in this di-
rection with its proposed new capital adequacy
framework. However, it chose to ask opinions of
market participants rather than observing market
prices and quantities. The committee then compound-
ed this by proposing to ask the opinions of the two
parties, the banks and their rating agencies, that have
incentives to underestimate the true risk exposure.
A superior system for obtaining a market-based
risk measure will use observed data from financial
markets on price or quantity, or both. That is, it will
use a market test. The relevant question to be ad-
dressed is which instruments should be observed,
how these instruments should be structured, and how
supervisors can best extract the risk signal from the
noise generated by other factors that may influence
observed prices and quantities. In principle, any un-
insured bank obligation can provide the necessary in-
formation. We favor sub-debt because we think it
will provide the cleanest signal.
There are alternatives to sub-debt. Common eq-
uity may currently have the advantages of being is-
sued by all large banks and of trading in more liquid
markets. However, investors in bank common equity
will sometimes bid up stock prices in response to
greater risk taking, so their signal can only be inter-
preted in the context of a model that removes the op-
tion value of putting the bank back to the firms
creditors (including the deposit insurer). In contrast,
valuable information can be extracted from subordi-
nated debt without a complicated model. If a banks
debt trades at prices equivalent to Baa corporate
bonds, then its other liabilities are at least Baa quality.
Banks also issue a variety of other debt obliga-
tions that could be used to measure their risk expo-
sure.32 The use of any debt obligation that is explicitly
excluded from the systemic risk exception in FDICIA
could provide a superior risk measure to those pro-
posed by the Basel Committee. Thus, we conclude
that sub-debt is the best choice because it
is the least senior of all debt obligations if a bank
should fail and, therefore, its yields provide the clearest
signal about the potential risk that the bank will fail.
We think sufficient information exists to adopt a sub-
debt proposal with the understanding that the plan will
be refined and made more effective as additional
information and analysis become available.
Conclusion
FDICIA sought to reform the incentives of both
banks and their supervisors. The least cost resolution
provisions were intended to expose banks to greater
market discipline and the prompt corrective action
provisions were intended to promote earlier and more
consistent supervisory discipline. Ongoing develop-
ments are undercutting both sources of discipline.
Whether the government would have been willing
to take the perceived short-term risks associated with
least cost resolution procedures for a very large bank
immediately after their introduction is debatable.
Arguably, those risks have increased significantly
as banks have grown larger and more complex.
Whether prompt corrective action based on book
values would have been effective in closing banks be-
fore they became economically insolvent is also ques-
tionable. Unquestionably, however, banks ability to
game regulatory risk measures has grown over the
last decade.
Although ongoing developments are undercutting
the intent of FDICIA, the premise that banks and their
supervisors should be subject to credible discipline
remains. Ideally, this discipline would come from
financial markets. While markets do not have perfect
foresight, they are both flexible enough to accept
promising innovations and willing to acknowledge
their mistakes, even if such recognition is politically
inconvenient.
Sub-debt provides a viable mechanism for pro-
viding such market discipline. It is already providing
useful signals in todays financial markets. We propose
to combine these signals with the gradual discipline
provided under prompt corrective action in a form
that is credible to banks and other financial market
participants.
This article provides a feasible approach to imple-
menting enhanced discipline through sub-debt. Our
proposal draws on the existing evidence on market
discipline in banking and the insights of previous
proposals and policy changes. The new plan provides
for phased implementation and leaves room for future
modifications as additional details concerning the
market for sub-debt are determined. The plan calls50 Economic Perspectives
for specific changes in those areas where we believe
the evidence is relatively clear, such as the fact that
large solvent banks should be able to issue sub-debt
at least once a year. In those areas where the evidence
is weak to non-existent, we defer decisions pending
additional study. This approach should enhance the
NOTES
1See Title 1, Section 108 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act entitled
The use of subordinated debt to protect the deposit system and
deposit system funds from too big to fail institutions.
2During crises, the pressure of having to respond quickly increases
the likelihood of introducing poorly structured regulation. Indus-
tries where regulatory reforms introduced during crises may have
caused significant long-term problems include banking in the
1930s (Kaufman, 1994) and the pharmaceutical industry following
the infamous Thalidomide incidents in the 1950s (Evanoff, 1989).
3An index of papers that can be downloaded from the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision website may be found at
www.bis.org/publ/index.htm.
4See Bank for International Settlement (1999).
5The rating agency obviously has an incentive to maintain its
credibility as an objective entity and could resist the pressure.
The incentives, however, would work in this direction.
6More generally, in recent years there has been growing concern
about the need to increase the role of market discipline in banking.
See, for example, Ferguson (1999), Meyer (1999), Stern (1998),
Boyd and Rolnick (1988), Broaddus (1999), and Moskow (1998).
7Direct discipline would result from an expected increase in the
cost of issuing debt in response to an increase in the banks per-
ceived risk profile. To avoid this increased cost the bank would
more prudently manage risk. Derived discipline results when
other agents (for example, supervisors) use the information from
sub-debt markets to increase the cost to the bank. For example,
as discussed below, bank supervisors could use debt yields as
triggers for regulatory actions.
8Additional discussion of the role of sub-debt in this plan can be
found in Evanoff (1993, 1994).
9Regulatory restrictions would be prompt-corrective-action-type
constraints such as limits to dividend payments or deposit and
asset growth rates once core equity fell below 2 percent of risk-
weighted assets.
10The sub-debt requirement is one component of Calomiriss
regulatory reform proposal aimed at modifying industry structure
and the operating procedures of the International Monetary Fund.
It would also include a mandatory minimum reserve requirement
(20 percent of bank debt in Calomiris, 1998), minimum securities
requirement, and explicit deposit insurance. Although some details
of his proposal, such as requiring the debt be issued to foreign
banks, may not be feasible for U.S. banks, the general approach
provides interesting insights into the issues in designing a sub-
debt plan for the U.S.
11This is not the first time proposals have suggested sub-debt be
linked with prompt corrective action; see Evanoff (1993, 1994)
and Litan (2000).
12The term banking is used generically and could include all
depository institutions.
13As discussed earlier, the current bank capital requirement
framework is being reevaluated (see Bank for International
Settlements, 1999). As part of the debate, some have recom-
mended total elimination of the tier 1 versus tier 2 distinction,
(for example Litan, 2000). If this approach is taken, we would
recommend that minimum leverage requirements be maintained
to ensure sufficient levels of equity (although it would be in sub-
debt holders self interest to ensure this occurs) and to provide
supervisors with an official tool for intervening when equity
levels fall to unacceptable levels.
14When fully implemented, the policy would apply to banks
instead of the bank holding company. During this surveillance
stage, however, information could be gained at both levels.
15Actually, progress is currently being made on these first two
items. The Board staff are actively involved in collecting and
analyzing sub-debt price data, and System staff are evaluating
how the markets react to debt spreads.
16The only exception would occur if general market conditions
precluded debt issuance by the corporate sector (both financial
and nonfinancial firms). This exception requires more specific
details, but it would be an industry-wide rather than a bank-
specific exception.
17The objective is to limit regulatory gaming; see Jones (2000).
Additional minimum denomination constraints could be imposed
to further ensure that debtholders are sophisticated investors, (for
example, see U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, 2000).
18Depending on the depth of the secondary market, this may need
to be extended to a couple of weeks. Again, the timeframe could
be modified as more market information is obtained. Additionally,
to allow for flexibility under extreme conditions, procedures
could be introduced by which the presumption could be over-
turned given the approval of the FDIC upon request by the banks
primary federal supervisor. The procedures for this exception,
however, would be somewhat similar to those currently in place
for too-big-to-fail exceptions, for example, submission of a pub-
lic document to Congress, etc.
19For example, should risk be measured as the spread between the
yield on a sub-debt issue and a comparable maturity Treasury
security, the yield on a banks sub-debt versus the yield on com-
parable maturity corporate bonds in different ratings classes, or
the spread over LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) after
the bond is swapped into floating rate funds.
credibility of the plan. Although the details of the
plan would evolve over time, once the basics are im-
plemented the industry and the public would see bank
behavior being significantly influenced by both mar-
ket and supervisory oversight. The combination should
make for a more effective, safe, and sound industry.51 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
20This is not to say that initiating changes to the accord would be
costless. Obviously negotiations would be required since other
country members may want to continue to have sub-debt be an
inferior form of capital. But from the participating U.S. banks
perspective and the regulators perspective (concerning program
flexibility), the elimination of these restrictions should result in
net benefits.
21We are not saying that detailed parameters should be introduced
at this time. As argued above, additional analysis is required
before these could be decided upon.
22Another potential issue is how the banks will respond to the
new regulation in an attempt to avoid sub-debt discipline. A review
of this issue is included in Kwast et al. (1999), and our proposal
raises no new concerns. The recently passed Financial Services
Modernization Act addresses some of these potential concerns by
significantly limiting credit enhancements on sub-debt.
23Jones (1998) suggests the cost of equity could be twice that of
debt once the tax differences are accounted for. Benston (1992)
discusses the cost differences and other advantages of sub-debt
over equity capital.
24Alternatively, the current owners could inject equity but that
may be costly in that it places them in a situation where they are
relatively undiversified.
25For example, see Kwast et al. (1999). The exception is Calomiris
(1998) which would require monthly changes via either debt issues
or asset shrinkage.
26This holding company premium is typically associated with the
bank having access to the safety net and the associated lower risk
of default during times of financial stress. Alternatively, it has
been argued the differential results from the different standing of
the two debtholders. Holders of bank debt have a higher priority
claim on the assets during liquidation of the bank than do the
holders of holding company debt which essentially has an equity
claim on the bank.
27The appendix was prepared by Thomas Brady and William
English of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Most of the comments in this section attributed to Kwast et al.
come from this appendix.
28Arguably, to the extent the capital requirements caused a reduc-
tion in bank lending during the early 1990s, it was because banks
were trying to increase their capital ratios due to new requirements
at the same time they were experiencing higher loan losses. A
discussion of the capital crunch is provided in Hancock and
Wilcox (1997, 1998). After banks have time to rebalance their
portfolios in response to new capital requirements they are likely
to have a cushion to absorb the higher loan losses incurred during
recessions. Wall and Peterson (1987, 1995) find evidence that
banks seek to maintain capital ratios in excess of regulatory
requirements and speculate that part of the reason for the higher
ratios is to absorb unexpected losses.
29The liquidity crunch in the fall of 1998 and the Long-Term
Capital episode are possible examples of such a problem period.
30For example, the American Banker reports that the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency is threatening to downgrade banks
safety and soundness rating if they fail to supply accurate Com-
munity Reinvestment Act data; see Seiberg (1999).
31Supervisory agencies could short circuit this avoidance by hav-
ing their examiners conduct subjective evaluations but that could
easily result in examiners serving as shadow managers of banks.
32Preferred stock is a form of equity but it would yield a clean
signal unlike common equity. We do not propose the use of pre-
ferred stock for two reasons. First, dividend payments on preferred
stock are not a deductible expense to the bank. Thus, forcing them
to issue preferred stock would increase their costs. Second, dis-
cussions with market participants, as reported in Kwast et al.
(1999, p. 45), indicated that the preferred stock market is more
heavily influenced by relatively uninformed retail investors.
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